ABSTRACT Friendship formation between a pair of individuals (dyads) and its dynamics is a complex phenomenon that has been extensively studied in the literature. Assortative, relational, and proximity mechanisms are the recognized social processes that are responsible for the formation of these dyadic ties. In this paper, we develop an agent-based model that derives its essence from social processes, fuzzy game theory, and social network analysis. The process of dyadic friendship formation depends on the agent's (participant's) spatial configuration, attributes affecting friendship, and interaction with other agents. To model these interactions, we use fuzzy iterated prisoner's dilemma (Fuzzy-IPD) utilizing the decision factors contributing to similar social processes. These strategies have been independently discussed in previously published studies. We, however, use them in combination to design a descriptive model with different experimental settings in an ad-hoc simulation framework. Using an integrationist approach, we blend multiple individual components of friendship formation to construct a comprehensive model. The analysis of the model thus developed reveals a possible interaction pattern responsible for the evolution of the layered associations. This paper further validates various levels of friendship ties (strong ties, medium ties, and weak ties) in social networks as reported in the published sociological studies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolution of cooperation and its different mechanisms concentrate on defection and cooperation strategies during an interaction between random partners [1] . A commonly used framework to model these interactions is Iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) [2] . Contrary to this aproach, partner choice models emphasise on the selection of partners to determine future players in interactions. These models have been evolved from the ''out-for-tat'' strategy [3] - [5] . Hruschka et al. [6] highlighted the importance of partner selection process to explain cooperation and friendship among dyads. In this exposition, we take this discussion a step further by investigating the co-dependence of dyadic friendship mechanisms like proximity, assortative (homophily), and relational (clustering and repetition) strategies [7] .
The dynamics of proximity relates to a higher likelihood of developing a relationship between geographically closer individuals [8] . Homophily particularises the tendency to form a bond with other similar individuals [9] . Clustering or transitivity reflects a higher possibility of developing ties with friends of friends. The dynamics of repetition refers to repeated interactions between the same individuals over the course of time [10] . Pappalardo et al. in their study of multidimensional networks, concluded that tie strength is strictly related to frequent interactions and people belonging to selective friendship circles have a greater tendency of forming strong bonds [11] .
Following are the relevant studies on friendship formation that have been reported in the literature to analyse partner selection models; Vos and Zeggelink [12] and Evelien [13] presented a model with agents having ''tension'' values to be minimised by taking different actions. Tension minimises with the identification of the desired number of similar friends. Jin et al. [14] studied the growth of social networks wherein the probability of forming ties depends on the number of already existing mutual friends and the fixed upper limit of friendship ties that an agent can achieve. The reduction in the strength of ties is modelled using an exponential function if the agents do not interact. Snijders et al. [15] used a utility based approach to define a cost of performing an action depending upon the endogenous and exogenous effects. In their study, at every discrete point, the model computes the probabilities that an agent can take in each action and selects the best alternative. Subsequently, ties are created, maintained or broken. Whitmeyer and Yeingst [16] approached friendship formation with the selection of two random agents to form a random strength tie between them. If the addition of the value of the new tie results in the total tie strength of the agent surpassing its capacity, then all the tie values are scaled back proportionately to keep the overall tie strength lower than its capacity. They employed a parameter ''fickleness'' to decide the fate of new ties and used the sentiment of homophily (general homophily) through a bias factor in the tie formation with grade preference and distance separation of some of the attributes. Sutcliffe et al. [17] demonstrated yet another approach to model friendship ties by analysing trust among agents as a measure of cooperation during an interaction. From entirely different vantage points, economists have also studied network formation [18] - [21] .
All the studies mentioned above are indicative; wherein agents take a crisp decision to either defect or cooperate. Recent studies implicate fuzzified attributes in the modelling of similar social processes [22] , [23] . The complicated nature of attributes, actions, and strength of ties involved in friendship mechanisms renders fuzzy logic as an appropriate choice to represent variables that can take a range of values or grades of membership [24] .
Hassan et al. [24] utilised fuzzy variables to investigate friendship dynamics. In their work, similarity calculation among agents is based on the exogenous factors with an objective function to determine a fuzzy value of friendship ties. The parameters of the objective function comprise of the similarity of agents and the total duration of their interaction. However, in their study, there is no provision for debilitating of ties since similarity measures remain constant, and the friendship values change with time. We, however, hypothesize that affinity must change due to repeated interactions among agents. Therefore, we also incorporate the relational mechanism to accommodate dynamic affinity that accounts for both strengthening and weakening of ties as a consequence of interactions.
Existing studies model a limited number of mechanisms that characterise dyadic friendships. The work presented here, however, attempts to integrate the broad mechanisms of dyadic relationships. Another major contribution of the paper is the development of an agent-based model that uses fuzzy logic and fuzzy IPD to model the interaction between agents. Furthermore, through the network of dyads simulated in this study, we validate the number of layered ties (weak, medium, and strong) of an agent as reported in different sociological experiments [25] . Hamill and Gilbert [26] elucidated the characteristics of personal social networks simulated through agent-based modelling [27] , [28] . In the result section, we have explained how these characteristics such as size and clustering of the modelled network are coherent with the values suggested in sociological literature [26] , [29] , [30] . Additionally, we present a detailed analysis of the model behaviour that arises due to fuzzy decisions augmented with game-theoretical strategies during interactions between dyads.
II. FRIENDSHIP PROCESSES THROUGH AGENT BASED MODELLING
Simulations lead to the formalization of theory, help to identify the cause-effect relationships, and underlying hidden processes. The results derived through simulation are particularly useful when analytical tools cannot cope up with increased complexity of the system. Agent-Based Models (ABM) of cooperation and social order are used to support a theoretical understanding and explanation of the role of evolution in the development of complex structures which are otherwise difficult to understand through empirical data [31] . ABM is utilised successfully in many disciplines ranging from simulating financial markets [32] , particle interactions [33] , cancer cell growth patterns [34] to social behaviours [35] .
A. FRIENDSHIP PROCESSES
In their pioneering work, Rivera et al. [7] thoroughly discussed and analysed three broad sociological mechanisms for the dyadic network formation. A brief outline of these mechanisms pertaining to our study is described below:
1) Proximity mechanism asserts that geographically closer individuals have a higher possibility of interaction, therefore, forming ties [8] . However, with the significant technological advancement, the access to long distance communications undermines the constraint of geographic propinquity [36] . Hence, the theory of ''social foci'' or common interests groups refer to the inadequacy of physical proximity alone in tie formation. Jones et al. [37] found a significant number of academic collaborations between authors belonging to geographically distant universities having similar research areas. 2) Assortative mechanism (Homophily), the tendency of similar individuals forming bonds, is a central notion in various friendship studies [9] . Selfhout et al. [38] examined the effect of big five personality traits in friendship networks. In another notable work, [39] analysed homophily based on race among ethnic group. 3) Relational mechanisms address the dynamics of clustering and repetition. Friendship networks have a deterministic nature of transitivity, i.e. individuals have a greater tendency of forming ties with friends of friends. Newman [40] observed that scientists had a proclivity towards co-authoring with authors who had collaborated with other common authors (dynamics of clustering). Investigation of adolescent social networks using exponential random graph models also exhibited transitivity in friendships including racial and grade preference in selective mixing [41] . Uzzi and Spiro [10] explained the inclination of collaborators to work with people with whom they have worked earlier, thereby enabling the repetition of ties in the future illustrating dynamics of repetition. The social mechanisms are implemented for the entire population using a sequence of steps as illustrated in Algorithm 1. Adverting to the proximity mechanism, agents interact with their neighbours in a predefined range. For an agent, we define neighbours as agents that belong in its geographic vicinity. The formation of weak, medium, and strong ties of an agent sums up to the number of its interacting neighbours. Hassan et al. [24] used five fuzzy attributes to characterise each agent, i.e., age, political ideology, religiosity, educational level, and economic status that are endorsed by the domain experts. 1 Previously published sociological studies have also documented the relevance of these attributes 1 Henceforth, we refer this set of five attributes as FA in rest of the paper.
Algorithm 1 Dyadic ties Formation
in facilitating the dynamics of Homophily associated with friendship formation [9] , [42] , [43] 
III. THE MODEL A. WEAK AND MEDIUM TIE FORMATION
In this study, we utilise the same five parameters as given by [24] to calculate initial affinity between an agent and its neighbours. However, after first iteration our model updates affinity values in successive interactions through relational mechanisms. The membership function used for fuzzification is linear for each attribute. Equation (1) describes the computation of initial affinity(IA ij ) between agent i and its neighbor agent j .
where n th attribute ∈ FA; FA = {age, political ideology, religiosity, educational level, economic status}, µ n (agent) = The degree of membership of agent's n th attribute in its fuzzy set, d() = function to compute the difference between the degree of membership's of the two agents under consideration, w n = weight of n th attribute and N () = fuzzy strong negation e.g.
For each agent, equation (2) computes a mutual friend factor (MFF) indicating the number of mutual neighbours that are likely to become friends. We use equation (1) to implement dynamics of homophily (Assortative Mechanism) [14] , [40] . Agents establish medium ties with their neighbours who have similar attributes as well as high number of mutual neighbours thereby realising dynamics of clustering (Relational mechanism). For each neighbour, if the MFF value is greater than a threshold (0.4), the neighbour is added to the group of medium-ties otherwise to the group of weak-ties ( Fig. 1) .
where MFF = Mutual Friends factor of agent i and its neighbor agent j , α = The rate at which the MFF rises, and m = Number of mutual neighbors. Furthermore, in friendship formation, the agents interact with their medium-ties thereby realising the dynamics of repetition (relational mechanism). We model these repeated interactions of the agents through a game of Fuzzy-IPD.
B. FUZZY ITERATED PRISONER'S DILLEMA
Sociological phenomena are often abstract and fuzzy in nature thereby, fuzzy payoffs and actions offer a more realistic modelling of the interactions. In situations like friendship formation, crisp actions may not provide a justified description of the scenario. The model developed in this study visualises the interaction between agents using Fuzzy-IPD. Therefore, we use fuzzy actions; wherein an agent can partially cooperate or defect. The succeeding paragraph concisely describes the concept of fuzzy-IPD given by [44] and (3) and (4)).
where µ c and µ d represent the degree of membership of action A in the fuzzy sets C and D (Fig. 2a ).
C. PAYOFFS AND AGENT AFFINITY
Agents defect or cooperate or take an action between these two crisp values according to the decision factors.
The computation of payoffs from the actions of the agents is the next step of the process. Table 1 shows the payoffs used in the classical prisoner's dilemma [45] . Fuzzy Payoffs received by an agent (ego 2 ) for its action A 1 and its alter agent's action A 2 , lie in a plane:
Equation (5) (after solving for the plane) shows the payoff:
After each round of game between two agents, affinity values associated with both the agents are updated accord-2 Ego and Alter: The terms correspond to the two interacting agents in the process of forming a tie. ''ego'' refers to the perspective agent who initiates the interaction and ''alter'' refers to the second agent who responds suitably ( [15] .) ing to the payoffs they receive. After a complete interaction, agent's histories are updated with the payoffs they receive.
We compute the initial affinity (Equation 1) that agent i perceives of agent j, before the interactions begin using homophily dynamics. Af ij refers to the affinity value that agent i perceives of agent j after interaction. Af ij updates as a consequence of payoffs received by the agents. This update mechanism is applied to all agents to compute affinity values with each of their neighbours, for instance Af ji . The value Af ij increases if agent i receives a decent payoff and value of Af ji decreases if agent j receives an insufficient payoff. Affinity values update according to equation (6) until they reach their minimum or maximum possible value (zero or one). Equation (6) uses the value ''2.5'' as the mean payoff received (since payoff varies in between 0 to 5).
Further, scaling parameter s decides the effect of a single iteration on the affinity values.
where Payoff ij = payoff received by agent i while interacting with agent j and s = scaling parameter. The payoffs are computed through actions of the interacting agents discussed in the subsequent sub-sections.
D. AGENT DECISIONS AND ACTIONS
All agents interact with their medium ties. Before taking a decision during a particular interaction, each agent evaluates two decision factors: f 1 and f 2. f 1 represents the influence of the last three moves of the alter agent and f 2 compares the affinity values between alter and ego. Here we take agent i (ego) and agent j (alter) to define f 1 (Equation 7) and f 2 (Equation 8) An agent maintains and updates the following two variables during decision-making procedure:
(a) History: For each of its medium tie, the ego maintains a list of previous three payoffs received from its alter. It accounts for the effect of recent payoffs that the ego obtains from its alter. We refer to this variable as Hist [k] , where k ∈ 1, 2, 3 (b) Affinity: For each of its medium tie, the ego maintains an affinity value for its alter. Equation (7) has been used in the literature to include memory capabilities in game-theoretic simulations [22] , [44] , [46] .
Following three individual fuzzy sets qualitatively characterises f 1 and f 2 respectively: 1) Poor, Fair, High sets for f 1 represent how poor, fair or high are the payoffs that an agent receive in comparison to the payoffs received by its alter agent during the previous three interactions (Fig. 2b) . 2) Lower (LW ), Similar (SL), Higher (GT ) sets for f 2 depict how much lower, similar or greater is the alter agent's affinity value for the ego (Fig. 2c ) In prior studies, researchers have highlighted the importance of modelling personalities in prisoner's dilemma game [22] , [47] - [49] . However, since we are using a fuzzy version of IPD, the stable personality traits of agents are modelled through the strategies they follow (Table 2) . Two interacting agents invariably cooperate with higher values of f 1 and f 2 and defect when f 1 and f 2 are poor or lower respectively. Although permutations of strategies other than mentioned here may exist, it seems irrational for an agent to cooperate for poor payoffs or lower affinity and defect for high payoffs and high-affinity values. Stern agents, however, can defect for fair payoffs or similar affinity in the hope of getting high payoffs or high affinity values as reflected in the different strategies.
An agent follows the following procedure to compute the final action:
(a) Calculate the values of f 1 and f 2 (equations (7) and (8)), and subsequently their degree of membership in respective fuzzy sets (Fig. 2b, Fig. 2c ). . agent 2 follows the same process to calculate the value of action for agent 1 . To summarise, the agent strategies select the nature of an action (Cooperation or Defection) while the decision rules (f 1 and f 2) determine the particular fuzzy value of the action. To decide an action, agent 1 computes the values of f 1 and f 2 (equations (7) and (8)), and subsequently their degree of membership in respective fuzzy sets (Fig. 2b, Fig. 2c ).
E. STRONG TIES FORMATION
The strength of medium ties increases gradually due to interaction process and the total duration of the prior interactions. Equations (10) represent a logistic function to compute friendship strength between agents using affinity values and duration of interaction. To compute a friendship strength value that changes with time for each medium tie, we use the same gain parameter g and the logistic function utilised by [24] . However, in our model we use varying affinity values instead of a constant value for similarity. The initial value for Af i.e. IA (Equation 1 ) is the same as similarity (R s in [24] ). However, it is iteratively revised through the payoffs received by agents during interaction. where g = J × Af ij × e p×Af ij and J , p, k, c = constants to adjust the effect of time (t) on the strength of friendship, Fr ij = Friendship strength perceived by agent i with agent j . Both agents form a strong tie if individual friendship strength is greater than or equal to 0.8, i.e. Fr ij ≥ 0.8 and Fr ji ≥ 0.8. Fig. 1 depicts the working procedure of layered tie formation for an agent in detail. If the absolute difference between their perceived friendship strength of friendship is greater than 0.8, i.e. Fr ij − Fr ji ≥ 0.8 then the tie is unreciprocated.
IV. SIMULATION AND MODEL PARAMETERS
The model was implemented and simulated in Netlogo [50] using a fuzzy extension [51] .
The model uses a world size of 25 × 25 and a randomly placed population of 750 agents. An agent only communicates with its neighbours i.e. agents occupying cells within neighbourhood radius of 6.5 ( Table 3) . The world size, population, and the neighbourhood radius determine the number of agents that will interact and form ties. For our experiments we kept the world size and population constant and varied the neighbourhood radius in the range of 4 -7 to analyse its effect on the simulations (Section V-A) To measure the similarity between agents, we take initial values of attributes in the range of 0 -100 with the default weights (w n ) for each attribute in the set FA as 0.2 (Algorithm 1). Weight vectors can either be determined using a learning mechanism or by establishing a kind of semantic association between attributes [52] . In this paper, we give an equal preference to each attribute to circumvent the loss of generality. However, further experimentation using unequal weights may include bias towards certain factors [53] .
The MFF determines medium ties formation in our model (equation (2)). The threshold (0.4) distinguishes the potential medium ties form weak ties (Fig. 1) .
Simulations conducted in this study use 500 as the default value for scaling parameter. However, we have also analysed its effect by varying this value in the range of 300-900 (Section V). Equation (10) represents the evolution of ties with time. The parameters j, p, k, c (Table 3 ) used in these equations are taken from the prior work of [24] . The agents with friendship strength greater than a threshold of (0.8) form a strong tie (Fig. 1) .
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A total of 200 simulations were conducted using the parameter settings as described in Table 3 . To mitigate the effect of minor perturbations due to randomness, we take the averaged values of different types of ties over multiple simulations. Further, to achieve conclusion stability, minimal change in the coefficient of variation in simulations has also been taken as an essential criterion to determine an adequate number of the simulations (Fig. 3) . The coefficient of variation (c v = standard deviation (SD) / mean) is a dimensionless measure suitable for experimental error analysis of multiple variables in simulation-based experiments [54] .
Analysis of the model simulations provides following results.
(a) Average number of strong ties, medium ties, and weak ties (Total ties) per agent (b) Behaviour of the agents (average actions, average decision factors) (c) A social network formed over time and its global clustering coefficient VOLUME 5, 2017 
A. ESTIMATION OF LAYERED NUMBER OF FRIENDSHIPS
While conducting experiments, we varied the neighbourhood radius within range 4 -7. Fig. 4 illustrates variation in different ties with increase in radius. At the radius value of 6.5, the number of ties matches the results reported in sociological studies (Table 4) . Agents who have strategies that promote bond formation sustain their friendship by rewarding each other with generous payoffs. The number of ties (Table 4) obtained validate the results reported in the previous studies [25] , [55] - [57] . The results derived in Fig. 5 reflect the evolution of strength of ties with time (Section III-E). Initially, the number of medium ties with friendship strength between 0.1 to 0.5 increases (Fig. 5c) . Thereafter, the strength of these ties approaches in the range of 0.5 -0.8 (Fig. 5b) . Agents with a higher affinity value for each other cross the thresholds of each range promptly. Essentially, agents sharing similar attributes form tie faster than the relatively dissimilar agents. All the combination of agents with cooperative strategies eventually develop high strength ties in the range 0.8 -1 (Fig. 5a ). (Fig. 5a) illustrates that the number of friends rises and then decreases before stablising. This behaviour has been explained in the section V-C. The constant value of the average number of strong ties obtained from the mean of multiple simulations is approximately 11 which is almost consistent with the established results in social processes.
In the literature on friendship dynamics, unreciprocated ties are considered volatile because they can be a source of embarrassment and mutual discomfort [58] , [59] . Hallinan and Maureen [60] observed that unreciprocated ties had a high rate of dissolution. Rivera et al. [7] concluded that oneway friendships are inherently unstable and transient if they are not reciprocated. Fig. 6 depicts the formation and dissolution of unreciprocated ties in our study that increase with time but eventually are withdrawn because of their instability. A more comprehensive explanation of how this behaviour evolves in our model is given in the section V-C.
B. FURTHER VALIDATION OF MODEL THROUGH EMPIRICAL DATA
So far the simulations have been carried out using randomly initialized attributes (FA). Further, to support the model's appropriateness, experimentations have also been conducted after initializing model parameters through empirical data obtained from the European Values Study (the year 2008) [61] .
European Values Study (EVS) is a survey research program to aggregate data of a wide range of questions related to work, religion, politics, society, education, etc for several regions in Europe. The initial model parameters (i.e. FA) were assigned values of age, religiosity, political ideology, education level, and economic status of people from the database variables of countries, Turkey and France, as recorded in the EVS dataset. Parameter education level was adopted as the weighted summation of age when attended last institution and grade of education. The value of the parameter religiosity was transformed and assigned depending on the categorical values, i.e., Atheists ∈ [0, 33), non-religious ∈ [33, 66), and religious ∈ [66, 100). Political ideology varied between extreme leftist (10) to extreme rightist (100) views. International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) of Occupational Status is taken as economic status of a person. Additionally, each attribute is preprocessed by Min-Max scaling. Table 5 illustrates the variation in ties corresponding to the control factor α (Equation 2) for three cases : Turkey, France, and Random. The highlighted cells in the table represent the optimal values of strong and medium ties that adhere to the previously published studies. Similiar results of other countries that are available in the data set may be obtained by tweaking the parameter α in the given range (0.0065 -0.008).
C. BEHAVIOUR OF DECISION RULES
Borges et al. [44] used fuzzy game theory with three decision rules, i.e., f 1, f 2 and f 3 to analyse strategies that performed better over others. However, an analysis of the decision rule responsible for the success or failure of a strategy is an important observable elucidated in this paper.
We consider two decision factors f 1 and f 2 along with three fuzzy sets corresponding to each factor to perform an in-depth analysis of the decision factors responsible for the formation of ties (Table 4) . In a world of mixed population, an agent with a randomly assigned strategy can interact with an agent with same or different strategy. Table 6 lists all combinations of such strategies resulting in different behavioural patterns. Pairs with harmonious combinations cooperate with each other and become friends while others do not. These combinations can be grouped into three categories based on their behavioural patterns: 1) Friendly: 1 st , 2 nd , and 3 rd , serial number agents in these combinations cooperate entirely with each other to evolve their friendship. 2) Unfriendly: 4 th , 5 th , and 6 th , serial number agents in these combinations generally defect with each other and do not form a strong tie. 3) Unreciprocated: 7 th , 8 th , 9 th , and 10 th ,serial number agents in these combinations both defect and cooperate. They represent unreciprocated ties that dissolute eventually. The reason behind the observed behaviour of these strategies originates from the decision factors f 1 and f 2. While f 1 is responsible for accounting the effect of payoffs received by VOLUME 5, 2017 FIGURE 7. Average fuzzy values of cooperative and defective decisions taken by the agents using f 1 and f 2 decision rules. agents in the current past, f 2 compares the affinity values of agents for each other. In each game, while deciding an action, an agent opts for the choice derived from the most dominating decision rule. Each category of combination i.e., Friendly, Unfriendly and Unreciprocated has a different dominant decision rule which may vary with time. Fig. 7 shows the average dominant decision rule used by pairs of all categories of combination leading to their respective actions. The graph is an amalgamation of values from the three categories of combination, and it can be explained appropriately by discussing the effect of each category. Initially, Af 12 and Af 21 values are exactly similar. Strategies which defect for similar values of affinity defect because of f 2 and strategies which cooperate for similar values of affinity cooperate because of f 2 justifying their high initial values in the graph.
1) FRIENDLY COMBINATIONS
Agents in these combinations are reciprocative, and they perpetually cooperate because of f 2 to increase their affinity till the highest strength bond is achieved. In Fig. 7 , friendly combinations invariably add to the value of cooperation due to f 2. These combinations result in the development of layered ties (Section V-A).
2) UNFRIENDLY COMBINATIONS
Agents in these combinations initially defect because of similar affinity values. However, affinity values may slightly change due to the random initial values assigned to f 1 resulting in a cooperative action. Over successive iterations, the difference in affinity values magnifies because of reduction in the values of f 2. The repeated dip in f 2 causes even less defective actions in an interaction. Approximately, beyond 150 ticks, 3 this change becomes observable. Since the payoffs are still poor or marginally fair in some cases, few agents cooperate, however, majority defect due to f 1 values. Consequently, the difference in affinity values further reduces and results to an increased defection (due to f 2 values) and a decreased defection (due to f 1 values) before stabilising to a constant value. In this process, these agents, being unfriendly, do not form a tie because their strategies favour defection, though, the reason for defection changes. In Fig. 7 unreciprocative combinations are responsible for the remaining highs and lows.
3) UNRECIPROCATIVE COMBINATIONS
In these combinations, interactions occur between two group of agents, i.e., A-type and B-type (Table 6 ). Initially due to same affinity values, A-type agents cooperate because of f 2 and B-type agents defect due to f 2. Therefore, A-type agents receive a bad payoff in comparison to B-type agents. Subsequently, A-type agents defect because of f 1 and B-type agents cooperate due to f 1 thereby leading to the observed initial values of f 1 for cooperation and defection (Fig. 7) . It is evident from Fig. 8 that at the beginning, on an average, f 2 is the dominant rule because of the similar affinity values. However, as the time passes by a sharp decrement is observed in the affinity values due to payoffs received in the previous iterations (Fig. 8) . Fig. 7 clearly illustrates a marked increase in cooperation due to f 1 and decline in cooperation due to f 2 beyond 20 (approximate) ticks since A-type agents which were cooperating because of similar affinity, now cooperate because of fair payoffs received over the interval. Moreover, B-type agents also partially cooperate because of partially high payoffs. This difference in cooperation leads to widening the gap between affinity values and points to the formation of unreciprocated ties. Type B-type agents who accept a high payoff from A-type agents have a high affinity towards them while A-type agents who receive relatively lower payoffs have low affinity for B-type agents. Over an approximate period (20 -200) , this gap increases gradually. In cases where agent A and agent B had an initial high affinity, it takes more time for the gap to grow. Meanwhile, due to evolution of ties with time (Section III-E), even friendship 12 crosses the threshold of strong ties (0.8). For instance if Af 12 and Af 21 was 0.93 initially and due to the interactions the values updated to 0.75 and 0.99 respectively in 100 ticks, friendship 12 and friendship 21 both acquire values above 0.8. After another 100 ticks, the difference between the affinity values increase and friendship 12 falls below 0.8. This phenomenon results in rising curve in Fig. 5a and declining curve in Fig. 6 . However, when the difference between the affinity values is enough to overcome the effect of evolution of ties, a surge in unreciprocated ties (Fig. 6 ) and a decrease in the number of strong ties (Fig. 5a ) can be observed.
As the difference of affinity values increase between agents, A-type agents experience low-affinity values (f 2) towards them and start defecting. While B-type agents, on the other hand, start cooperating because of f 2 instead of f 1 due to their existing high-affinity values. Subsequently, B-type agents start defecting too because of f 1 since the payoffs received by them are not sufficient. The gap between unreciprocated ties reaches its maximum. Thereafter, because of the defection from A-type (due of f 2), B-type agents start defecting due to f 2 and the affinity values for A-type agents reduces. The gap between unreciprocated ties gets bridged along with the curve approaching zero suggesting the non-existence of unreciprocated ties (similar to unfriendly strategies) (Fig. 6) . When the gap between the unreciprocated ties reduces, friendship 12 and friendship 21 acquire a value of almost zero, accounting for the final decreased values observed in the defection due to f 2, cooperation due to f 2, and defection due to f 1 (Fig. 7) .
Eventually, cooperation and defection due to decision rules acquire a constant value leading to the final mixed behaviour by each type of combination of strategies possible. Fig. 8 elucidates the dominance of each decision rule in agent actions. Fig. 9 shows cooperation or defection due to any decision factors witnessed in simulations and Fig. 10 illustrate fuzzy actions (from zero to one, zero being defection and one being cooperation) taken by agents on an average. Although the values fluctuate in adherence with the behaviour described above, overall cooperative actions dominate over overall defective actions.
D. SCALING PARAMETER
The scaling parameter (s) manages the intensity with which the payoffs influence the affinity values in one iteration (equation (6)). Agents receive payoffs in an interval ∈ [0, 5] in each round of the game. The scaling parameter suitably scales down the payoffs to update the affinity values. A higher s value reduces the effect of payoffs on affinity values in each round of the game, and increase the execution time of the model to observe simulation behaviour. In this study, we executed multiple simulations with scaling parameter in range 300-900 (with a default value of 500). Accruing to the fact that model takes longer to reach the result with higher values of s and more agents in the unreciprocated combinations cross the threshold of being friends. Fig. 11 a, b , c, and d depict an interesting pattern with raised peaks for greater values of s. Affinity values drift apart at a slower pace because of less intensity of payoffs of the game, and more unreciprocated ties appear to be strong ties (Section III-E). Gradually, as the gap between affinity values increases, these ties become unreciprocative again and eventually become unfriendly (Fig. 12 a, b, c, and d) E. CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT Global clustering coefficient (c), first introduced by [62] , is a measure of transitivity of a network. In this study, it represents the average fraction of pairs of a persons friends who are friends among themselves. To compute c, we use ''transitive triples'' (equation 11) [63] . c has a value of one for a fully connected graph and a value zero for a random graph (due to a large number of nodes). A higher value of c confirms a social network structure rather than a random network which has a significantly lesser value for the same number of nodes. Newman and Mark [64] summarised the value of c for different social networks (Table 7) . Another relevant study in this context is published by [14] wherein they have used a similar approach to calculate the clustering coefficient (≈0.45) for their model. c = 3 × Number of triangles Number of connected triples of vertices (11) In our model, we compute custrering coefficient as follows; c random = (Average number strong ties)/(number of agents) = 11/750 = 0.014. The c observed value of this model increases as more number of ties are formed and stabilise at a value of 0.4545 (Fig. 13) . Such a high value (0.4545) of clustering coefficient in comparison to a random network is indicative of transitivity in the modelled network.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dyadic friendship formation is a complex phenomenon that encapsulates several intriguing patterns resonating cohesively with each other. Different sociodemographic, psychological, behavioural, and intra personal attributes account for similarity among people to become friends. This study provides an extended analysis of friendship evolution using fuzzy game theory-based implementation of assortative, relational, and proximity mechanisms as observed in real life friendship networks. The analysis made in this work validates previously reported results of average number of strong, medium, and weak ties. This study also contributes towards a closer examination of finer nuances of the underlying behaviour of layered tie formation. Further, network generated in this study proved to be a non-random network reflecting the appropriateness of the simulations conducted. We conducted additional statistical analysis to increase the efficacy of the developed model through the methodical design of simulations. Experimentation with different agent attributes and strategies along with addressing various fuzzy decision factors while incorporating the error in perception has been left as the future work of this study.
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